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CEO Pensions: Disclosure, Managerial Power, and Optimal Contracting 
Abstract 
CEOs often receive pensions that provide life annuities of up to 60% of their final salary plus bonus. I 
investigate the extent to which pensions are managerial rent extraction and/or the result of optimal 
contracting between CEOs and boards of directors. Specifically, I examine whether CEOs exploit limited 
disclosure requirements to hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits and whether pensions are 
associated with CEO power and/or contracting determinants. Overall, my results provide some support 
for both the managerial power and optimal contracting views of pensions. Economic contracting 
variables, however, appear to explain pension benefit levels to a greater extent than measures of CEO 
power. This suggests that although pensions can be used to extract rents, this practice appears to be 
limited. In addition, my results suggest that pension-based rent extraction can be detected using public 
disclosures, implying that recent SEC changes in pension disclosure requirements are likely to have little 
effect on investors’ ability to value pensions. 
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CEOs often receive pensions that provide life annuities of up to 60% of their final salary plus 
bonus. I investigate the extent to which pensions are managerial rent extraction and/or the result 
of optimal contracting between CEOs and boards of directors. Specifically, I examine whether 
CEOs exploit limited disclosure requirements to hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits 
and whether pensions are associated with CEO power and/or contracting determinants. Overall, 
my results provide some support for both the managerial power and optimal contracting views of 
pensions. Economic contracting variables, however, appear to explain pension benefit levels to a 
greater extent than measures of CEO power. This suggests that although pensions can be used to 
extract rents, this practice appears to be limited. In addition, my results suggest that pension-
based rent extraction can be detected using public disclosures, implying that recent SEC changes 
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PENSIONit = α + β1Ln(ASSETS)it + β2CEO AGEit + β3BOOK TO MARKETit + β4R&Dit + β5PP&Eit  
                  + β6IDIOSYNCRATIC RISKit + β7LEVERAGEit + β8AAA/AAit + β9Ait + β10BBBit  
                  + β11JUNKit + β12GINDEXit +β13BLOCKHOLDERSit + β14CHAIRit + β15BOARD SIZEit  










































TOTAL COMPENSATIONit =  α + β1Ln(ASSETS)it + β2BOOK TO MARKETit + β3CEO AGEit  
                                                 + β4RETURNSit + β5ROAit + β6VOLATILITYit + β7SD ROAit 
                                                 + β8GINDEXit + β9BLOCKHOLDERSit + β10CHAIRit  
                                                 + β11BOARD SIZEit + β12INSIDE DIRECTORSit + β13DIRECTOR AGEit  




EXCESS COMPENSATIONit = β8GINDEXit + β9BLOCKHOLDERSit + β10CHAIRit + β11BOARD SIZEit 









PENSION ACCRUALit = α + β1Ln(ASSETS)it + β2CEO AGEit + β3RETURNSit + β4ROAit  
                                        + β5BOOK TO MARKETit + β6R&Dit + β7PP&Eit + β8IDIOSYNCRATIC RISKit 
                                        + β9LEVERAGEit + β10AAA/AAit + β11Ait + β12BBBit + β13JUNKit  
                                        + β14EXCESS COMPENSATIONit + ειt 
 
PENSION ACCRUALit =  α + β1Ln(ASSETS)it + β2CEO AGEit + β3RETURNSit + β4ROAit  
                                        + β5BOOK TO MARKETit + β6R&Dit + β7PP&Eit + β8IDIOSYNCRATIC RISKit  
                                        + β9LEVERAGEit + β10AAA/AAit + β11Ait + β12BBBit + β13JUNKit  
                                        + β14GINDEXit +β15BLOCKHOLDERSit + β16BOARD SIZEit  
                                        + β17INSIDE DIRECTORSit + β18DIRECTOR AGEit + β19INTERLOCKSit  




































DISCLOSEit = α + β1GINDEXit + β2BLOCKHOLDERSit + β3CHAIRit + β4BOARD SIZEit  
                       + β5INSIDE DIRECTORSit + β6DIRECTOR AGEit + β7INTERLOCKSit  
















































BIASit = α + β1Ln(ASSETS)it + β2CEO AGEit + β3GINDEXit + β4BLOCKHOLDERSit + β5CHAIRit  
             + β6BOARD SIZEit + β7INSIDE DIRECTORSit + β8DIRECTOR AGEit + β9INTERLOCKSit  

















































































































































1. (f) Defined Benefit or Actuarial Plan Disclosure.  








PENSION PLAN TABLE 
 
       Years of Service         
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  Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3  
CEO AGE 57.21 6.09 53.00 58.00 61.00 
Ln(ASSETS) 9.30 1.59 8.11 9.34 10.32 
COMPETITION 0.30 0.27 0.09 0.24 0.44 
Investment Opportunities:      
   BOOK TO MARKET 0.71 0.21 0.58 0.74 0.89 
   R&D 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 
   PP&E 0.28 0.22 0.12 0.24 0.41 
   IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK -1.28 0.38 -1.54 -1.35 -1.05 
Asset Substitution:      
   LEVERAGE 0.29 0.17 0.19 0.27 0.38 
   AAA/AA 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   A 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
   BBB 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
   JUNK 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEO Power:      
   GINDEX 10.23 2.43 9.00 10.00 12.00 
   BLOCKHOLDERS 1.89 1.48 1.00 2.00 3.00 
   CHAIR 0.81 0.39 1.00 1.00 1.00 
   BOARD SIZE 2.38 0.24 2.20 2.40 2.48 
   INSIDE DIRECTORS 0.23 0.12 0.13 0.20 0.29 
   DIRECTOR AGE 59.99 2.44 58.23 60.10 61.86 
   INTERLOCKS 0.08 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      
N   172     
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the proprietary sample. I measure all variables as of fiscal 
year end 2003. CEO AGE is the CEO’s age as of fiscal year end. Ln(ASSETS) is the natural logarithm of 
total assets (DATA6). BOOK TO MARKET is the ratio of the book value of assets to the market value of 
assets (DATA6/(DATA199*DATA25+DATA181)). R&D is the ratio of research and development 
expenditures to total assets (DATA46/DATA6). PP&E is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to 
total assets (DATA8/DATA6). IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK is the log of the standard deviation of the residuals 
from a market model estimated over the preceding 24 months. COMPETITION is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index for the firm’s industry (six digit NAICS). LEVERAGE is the ratio of long and short term 
debt to the book value of total assets ((DATA9+DATA34)/DATA6). AAA/AA, A, BBB, and JUNK are 
indicator variables for the firm’s S&P Long Term Debt Rating (SPDRC). GINDEX is the firm’s G Score, 
which is the simple sum of the firm’s anti-takeover protections (Gompers et al. 2003). BLOCKHOLDERS 
is the number of institutional investors that hold 5% or more of the firm’s common shares outstanding. 
CHAIR is an indicator for whether the CEO chairs the board. BOARD SIZE is the natural logarithm of the 
number of directors on the board. INSIDE DIRECTORS is the percent of directors who are insiders. 






 Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
CEO AGE 55.67 6.90 51.00 56.00 60.00 
Ln(ASSETS) 9.43 1.40 8.35 9.28 10.29 
RETURNS 0.17 0.33 -0.01 0.12 0.29 
ROA 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.10 
Investment Opportunities:      
   BOOK TO MARKET 0.61 0.23 0.42 0.62 0.82 
   R&D 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 
   PP&E 0.24 0.22 0.07 0.17 0.37 
   IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK -1.48 0.41 -1.78 -1.52 -1.24 
Asset Substitution:      
   LEVERAGE 0.23 0.17 0.11 0.21 0.31 
   AAA/AA 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   A 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
   BBB 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
   JUNK 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEO Power:      
   GINDEX 9.73 2.50 8.00 10.00 11.00 
   BLOCKHOLDERS 1.72 1.37 1.00 2.00 3.00 
   CHAIR 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 
   BOARD SIZE 2.35 0.26 2.20 2.40 2.48 
   INSIDE DIRECTORS 0.28 0.15 0.17 0.25 0.38 
   DIRECTOR AGE 59.79 3.11 57.89 59.83 61.82 
   INTERLOCKS 0.06 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the S&P 500 sample, which includes firms that are in the 
Index for fiscal 2004 and/or 2005. RETURNS is the annual stock return. ROA is the return on assets 








 Lump Sum Protection  
 Provide Disclose Provide Disclose  
Number of Firms 99 38  62 6  
Percentage of Firms (%) 58  38  36        10  
       




 Bias    
 $ in 000s %    
Mean -593.96 -7.50    
Standard Deviation 1,307.09 13.60    
      
Minimum -3,461.53 -29.32    
Q1 -1,315.62 -18.66    
Median -490.57 -8.53    
Q3 -156.87 -2.14    
Maximum 4,181.76 37.98    
      
N 61 61    
 
This table presents the disclosure of plan options and bias in estimates of pension benefits based on 
public disclosures for the proprietary sample. Panel A presents tabulations of how many firms provide 
lump sum payouts and protections (Rabbi and Secular trusts) and, conditional on provision, how many 
firms disclose in proxy statements. Panel B presents the distribution of bias. For firms that provide lump 
sum payouts but do not disclose in public filings, I calculate bias as the difference between an estimate 
based on public disclosures and the value of pension benefits based on actual plan details. The top of the 
table presents the distribution of bias as both the dollar difference and the dollar difference deflated by the 
actual plan value. Negative values represent the extent to which estimates based on public disclosures 









 N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 95th Pct. 99th Pct. 
Fiscal Year End 2004 520 3,289.61 6,146.29 0.00 859.97 3,876.73 14,685.91 23,572.51




 Pred. Sign Tobit Probit Truncated  Tobit Probit Truncated   
Ln(ASSETS) + 0.00 -0.02 0.34*** -0.15 -0.04 0.30***  
CEO AGE + 0.09** 0.00 0.14*** 0.02 -0.01 0.12***  
Investment Opportunities:         
   BOOK TO MARKET + 3.76*** 0.44*** -1.25*** 3.69*** 0.45*** -1.14***  
   R&D - -4.84 0.05 -3.77 -9.02 -0.31 -4.32*  
   PP&E + 3.44*** 0.31** 0.68** 2.68** 0.24* 0.66**  
   IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK - -3.49*** -0.34*** -0.02 -2.82*** -0.28*** 0.02  
Asset Substitution:         
   LEVERAGE + 2.22 0.14 0.19 2.60 0.21 0.18  
   AAA/AA + 4.15*** 0.24** 0.04 3.49*** 0.21** 0.05  
   A + 3.29*** 0.24*** 0.00 2.56*** 0.19*** 0.02  
   BBB + 1.26 0.08 -0.25 0.53 0.03 -0.28  
   JUNK + 1.92 0.13 -0.47 1.23 0.09 -0.45  
CEO Power:         
   GINDEX +    0.09 0.01 -0.03  
   BLOCKHOLDERS -    -0.03 -0.01 0.00  
   CHAIR +    2.32*** 0.22*** 0.46***  
   BOARD SIZE +    2.60** 0.26** -0.01  
   INSIDE DIRECTORS +    -7.24*** -0.65*** -0.75*  
   DIRECTOR AGE +    0.13 0.01 0.01  
   INTERLOCKS +    0.50 0.09 -0.08  
         
N  833 833 552 833 833 552  
Pseudo R2  0.25 0.18 0.43 0.33 0.25 0.45  
Correctly Classified (%)   75.51   76.59   
















GINDEX 0.62 0.60 0.98 
BLOCKHOLDERS -0.28 0.35** 0.29** 
CHAIR 0.92 0.64** 0.72** 
BOARD SIZE 0.17 0.13 0.16 
INSIDE DIRECTORS -0.08 -0.02* -0.05 
DIRECTOR AGE 1.64 0.26** 0.40** 
INTERLOCKS 0.02 0.01 0.02 
***, **, * Significantly different from the 95th Percentile at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed test) 
 
This table presents analyses of the level of pension benefits for S&P 500 CEOs in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. Panel A presents the distribution of 
the present value of their accrued pension benefits. Panel B presents investigates the determinants of pension benefits. The dependent variable in 
the Tobit and Truncated Regression models is the natural logarithm of one plus the present value of accrued pension benefits. The dependent 
variable in the Probit model is a binary variable coded as one if the CEO receives pension benefits, and zero otherwise. I cluster standard errors in 
all models at the CEO level to account for multiple observations on the same CEO. I report coefficients for the Tobit models, marginal probabilities 
for the Probit models, and marginal effects for the Truncated Regression models. I calculate the Pseudo R2s for the Tobit and Truncated 
Regression models as the square of the Pearson correlation between the dependent variable and predicted value. I report McFadden Pseudo R2s 
for the Probit models. I industry adjust the following variables: GINDEX, BLOCKHOLDERS, BOARD SIZE, INSIDE DIRECTORS, DIRECTOR 
AGE, and INTERLOCKS. Table 1 provides definitions of the independent variables. Panel C compares the 95th percentile of pension benefits for 
fiscal 2004 to firms in the S&P 500 and to those firms in the S&P 500 that provide pension benefits. I report industry adjusted means for the CEO  






 Pred. Sign OLS  
INTERCEPT  -6,651.88*** -6,039.66***  
Ln(ASSETS) + 330.97*** 266.20***  
CEO AGE + 56.22*** 52.54***  
RETURNS + 476.92 655.23*  
ROA + 1,948.41 2,163.02  
Investment Opportunities:     
   BOOK TO MARKET + 517.72 807.91  
   R&D - 1,107.52 434.05  
   PP&E + 1,414.30*** 1,374.93***  
   IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK - -343.79 -266.83  
Asset Substitution:     
   LEVERAGE + -2,421.78*** -2,158.97***  
   AAA/AA + 1,417.13*** 1,187.03**  
   A + 532.93 313.63  
   BBB + 84.55 -89.44  
   JUNK + 11.65 -200.37  
CEO Power:     
   GINDEX +  -6.96  
   BLOCKHOLDERS -  -124.15  
   BOARD SIZE +  1,239.21**  
   INSIDE DIRECTORS +  -1,936.61**  
   DIRECTOR AGE +  -34.25  
   INTERLOCKS +  -108.67  
EXCESS COMPENSATION + 0.16** 0.23**  
     
N  386 386  
Adj. R2  0.22 0.24  
***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed test) 
 
This table presents estimates of the association between pensions and excess compensation. The 
explanatory variable EXCESS COMPENSATION is that portion of compensation that is associated with 
measures of CEO Power. I estimate a first stage regression in which the dependent variable is total 
compensation (excluding pension benefits) and the independent variables include contracting 
determinants of compensation and CEO Power measures. I calculate EXCESS COMPENSATION as the 
linear combination of the estimated coefficients from the first stage and the CEO Power measures: 
 
iii MEASURESPOWERCEOδONCOMPENSATIEXCESS ∑= )  
 
I industry adjust the following variables: GINDEX, BLOCKHOLDERS, BOARD SIZE, INSIDE 
DIRECTORS, DIRECTOR AGE, and INTERLOCKS. I drop CHAIR because it is highly correlated (0.75) 






  Logit   
 Pred. Sign Lump Sum Protection   
INTERCEPT  -2.44** -1.38   
CEO Power:      
   GINDEX +/- 0.16 0.44   
   BLOCKHOLDERS +/- 0.09 0.10   
   CHAIR +/- 1.17 -1.43   
   BOARD SIZE +/- -0.77 2.19   
   INSIDE DIRECTORS +/- -1.86 3.25   
   DIRECTOR AGE +/- 0.06 -0.29   
   INTERLOCKS +/- 0.56 1.17   
EXCESS PENSION - 0.05 0.00   
COMPETITION + 1.14 -2.63   
       
N   77  43    
Pseudo R2  0.08 0.27   
p Value  0.60 0.50   
Correctly Classified (%)  67.53 90.70   
***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed test) 
 
This table presents analyses of the determinants Lump Sum payout and Protection (Rabbi and Secular 
trusts) disclosures for the proprietary sample. The dependent variable for the Lump Sum logistic 
regression is an indicator variable for whether conditional on providing a lump sum payout option the firm 
discloses in its proxy statement. The dependent variable for the Protection logistic regression is an 
indicator variable for whether conditional on protecting the plan the firm discloses in its proxy statement. 
EXCESS PENSION is the residual from a pension benchmark model based on the specifications used in 
Table 4. I include contracting determinants in the pension benchmark model and estimate the benchmark 
model on the entire proprietary sample. I industry adjust the following variables: GINDEX, 
BLOCKHOLDERS, BOARD SIZE, INSIDE DIRECTORS, DIRECTOR AGE, and INTERLOCKS. Table 1 







  OLS  
 Pred. Sign $ in 000s %  
INTERCEPT  -1,182.42 -0.325  
Ln(ASSETS)  -70.00 0.010  
CEO AGE  21.47 0.002  
CEO Power:     
   GINDEX +/- -6.91 0.001  
   BLOCKHOLDERS +/- 169.63 0.002  
   CHAIR +/- -136.28 0.008  
   INSIDE DIRECTORS +/- 4,279.68*** 0.388**  
   BOARD SIZE +/- 1,040.30 0.090  
   DIRECTOR AGE +/- 18.89 -0.001  
   INTERLOCKS +/- -251.97 0.001  
EXCESS PENSION - -0.04 -0.015  
COMPETITION + 5.30 0.066  
     
N   50  50  
Adj. R2  0.13 -0.03  
p Value  0.12 0.59  
***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed test) 
  
This table presents analyses of the determinants of bias in estimates of pension benefits based on public 
disclosures. The bottom of the table presents two OLS regressions that investigate the determinants of 
bias. I drop two outliers with extreme DFFITS (Belsley et al. 1980). EXCESS PENSION is the residual 
from a pension benchmark model based on the specifications used in Table 4. I include contracting 
determinants and CEO power measures in the pension benchmark model and estimate it on the entire 
proprietary sample. I industry adjust the following variables: GINDEX, BLOCKHOLDERS, BOARD SIZE, 
INSIDE DIRECTORS, DIRECTOR AGE, and INTERLOCKS. Tables 1 and 2 provide definitions of the 
independent variables. 
 
